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Having Their Cake and Eating It Too?
Post-emancipation Child Support as a Valid
Judicial Option
Lauren C. Barnettt
INTRODUCTION

At age thirteen, Jhette Diamond moved out of her mother's
home. Jhette described the environment in the house as one of
substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect. A motivated
and responsible girl, Jhette had worked since the age of eleven
and was a dedicated student.
Dominique Moceanu had a markedly different childhood.
Under pressure from her parents, Dominique intensively trained
to become a world-class gymnast. After winning the gold medal
at the 1996 Olympics, Dominique and her teammates became
national celebrities and earned millions of dollars in endorsements.
What unites Jhette and Dominique is what both girls did in
their later teen years: sue their parents for legal emancipation.
Jhette argued that she needed independence to obtain her own
report cards and health insurance; Dominique contended that
her parents had failed to give her a normal childhood and had
squandered her fortune. Courts granted both requests.
While Dominique sought emancipation to protect her income from her parents, Jhette asked the court for the opposite.
She petitioned to collect, after emancipation, both retroactive
and prospective child support from her mother. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico ultimately ruled in Jhette's favor, holding
that a minor could be emancipated for certain purposes while
reserving the right to seek support from her parent.'

t AB 2008, Princeton University; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Diamond v Diamond,283 P3d 260, 272 (NM 2012).
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The relationship between emancipation and child support is
an uncertain aspect of family law. At first glance, these seem
like divergent concepts: emancipation severs a relationship between parent and child, while child support creates a financial
bond between them. Emancipation can be triggered automatically (through the child reaching the age of majority, marrying, or
joining the military) or voluntarily (through a court order requested by the child or parent). For many centuries, the prevailing jurisprudence has held that when a child becomes emancipated, any parental support obligation ceases.2
This Comment considers when, if ever, emancipation does
not end the parents' duty to provide child support. Jhette Diamond's case in July 2012 (Diamondv Diamonds) was the first of
its kind, holding that a child could be considered statutorily
emancipated but continue to receive support payments under
certain circumstances.4 This Comment argues that Diamond
should not be considered rogue or aberrational; instead, several
states' emancipation schemes provide room for the concept of
"partial emancipation" by which a child may be deemed emancipated for some purposes but not others.
The following Parts undertake the first post-Diamond examination of emancipation and child support in the United
States. Part I explains the background on emancipation and
child support, identifying the statutes and theories behind each.
Part II discusses the case law on emancipation and child support, highlighting the majority "either/or" approach adopted in
various state courts and how Diamond diverged from this in
significant ways. Part III finds support for a Diamond-like approach by examining: (1) the purpose of child support and emancipation statutes, (2) the treatment of parental rights and obligations in similar statutes, (3) examples of blurred-line instead
of bright-line age requirements for minors, and (4) changed circumstances in the status of minors and in other areas of family
law. Part III then proposes that judges should consider the totality

2

See Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of

Parental Obligation, 86 Cal L Rev 41, 51 (1998) (noting that in the 1870s, "children who
were emancipated ... or who refused to obey reasonable parental commands were no
more entitled to parental support than the able-bodied were entitled to public funds");
Donald T. Kramer, 1 Legal Rights of Children, § 15:9 at 543 (West rev 2d ed 2005 &
Supp 2012) ("Emancipation of a child suspends the parent's support obligation.").
3 283 P3d 260 (NM 2012).
4
See id at 272.
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of circumstances in interpreting child support and emancipation
rights in individual cases.
I. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS EMANCIPATION AND WHAT IS CHILD
SUPPORT?
While the average person might think of his family in terms
of love and affection instead of legal obligations, much of the
parent-child dynamic is in fact codified by statutes. Parents
have the duty to provide their child with support, protection,
and education; in return, parents retain the right to the custody,
control, services, earnings, and obedience of their child.6 This relationship generally continues until the child reaches the age of
majority, which differs from state to state.6
Emancipation and child support can be thought of as legal
options for when the traditional family structure goes awry. If a
parent does not provide for a child's well-being in tangible ways,
a court can order him to make support payments.7 Emancipation, on the other hand, is akin to ending the period of childhood
early: "it denotes the transformation of a child to adult status
with the bestowing of attendant privileges and duties and the
termination of the legal rights and obligations that had existed
between parent and child."8
Common law notions of emancipation and child support
have been codified in state statutes. Every state has a child support statute. A federal office oversees the child support collections system,9 meaning that these statutes tend towards uniformity from state to state. 0 By contrast, the codification of
5 Dana F. Castle, Early Emancipation Statutes: Should They Protect Parents as
Well as Children?, 20 Fam L Q 343, 343 n 1 (1986), citing 67A Corpus Juris Secundum
Parentand Child § 3 at 172 (West 1978). See also Memphis Steel Const. Co v Lister, 197
SW 902, 904 (Tenn 1917) ("The duties and obligations of parent and child are, in some
measure, reciprocal.").
6
For a table of the age of majority in each state, see National Conference of State
Legislatures, Termination of Support: Age of Majority (NCSL June 2012), online at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/termination-of-child-support-age-of
-majority.aspx (visited Nov 24, 2013), citing Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for Children & Families, US Department of Health & Human Services, Intergovernmental Referral Guide (Nov 26, 2012), online at http://www.acf.hhs.gov
/programs/css/resource/irg (visited Nov 24, 2013).
7
See, for example, Nichols v Tedder, 547 S2d 766, 769 (Miss 1989) (noting that
child support is money for a child's basic care and maintenance).
8 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 343 n 3 (cited in note 5).
9

See Part I.B.

10 See Patricia W. Hatamyar, Interstate Establishment, Enforcement, and Modification of Child Support Orders,25 Okla City U L Rev 511, 512 (2000).
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emancipation law is much more haphazard; some states have no
statutes, while other states have statutes detailing the procedure for obtaining an emancipation order and the legal consequences of doing so.
This Part provides background necessary for understanding
the uncertainty at the intersection of emancipation and child
support. It gives an overview of the state statutes on emancipation and child support, and the confluence of these two concepts
in state legislative schemes.
A.

Emancipation: Background, Statutes, and Theories

The doctrine of emancipation severs the relationship between child and parent. Courts have analyzed the doctrine of
emancipation since as early as 1818.11 Black's Law Dictionary
defines emancipation as:
1. The act by which one who was under another's power
and control is freed.
2. A surrender and renunciation of the correlative rights
and duties concerning the care, custody, and earnings of
a child .

. .

. This act also frees the parent from all legal

obligations of support.12
Black's
further
defines
"partial
emancipation"
as
"[e]mancipation that frees a child for only a part of the period of
minority, or from only a part of the parent's rights, or for only
some purposes."13
Grounds for automatic emancipation include the child's
reaching the age of majority, entering the military, or marrying.14 Courts evaluate additional, discretionary grounds for
emancipation on a case-by-case basis. These grounds include
when a child becomes economically self-sufficient, becomes
pregnant, withdraws from parental control and supervision, or
refuses contact with a noncustodial parent.1 The emancipation
order typically ends the parent's right to control the child, ends
11 See Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 347 n 23 (cited in note 5); Sanford N. Katz, William A.
Schroeder, and Lawrence R. Sidman, EmancipatingOur Children-Comingof Legal Age
in America, 7 Fam L Q 211, 211 (1973).
12 Black's Law Dictionary 598 (West 9th ed 2009).
13 Id.
14 See, for example, Cal Fam Code § 7002.
15 See Laura W. Morgan, What Constitutes Emancipation to Release a Parentfrom
a Child Support Obligation, 12 Divorce Litig 1, 2 (2000) (summarizing the circumstances
under which a minor will be considered emancipated).
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the parent's entitlement to the services and earnings of the
child, and-most significantly-ends the child's right to parental
support.16
Emancipation doctrine can be traced from nonexistence in
Puritan families of colonial America, to increasing economic protections for child laborers in the Industrial Revolution, to the
growth of the state's role in safeguarding the best interests of
the child in the Progressive and New Deal eras. 7 For much of
the twentieth century, however, emancipation remained a vague
common law concept.', Emancipation orders were "granted at
the court's discretion for specific purposes."9
By a recent count, eighteen states today continue to grant
emancipations only as a common law construct. 20 The remaining
states have enacted statutes that codify each state's rules on
emancipation procedures, conditions, and effects. This wave of
emancipation statutes evinced a focus on children's rights, as
opposed to parents' rights. From the earliest statute in the
1960s to the most recent statute in 2009, the laws have become
increasingly specific in their criteria for emancipation and its
consequences. Nonetheless, the requirements for emancipation
and the effects and purposes served by emancipation have varied greatly from state to state. For this reason, emancipation
has been described as a "confused doctrine."21
Great variation continues to exist among these statutes today. The statutes typically focus on a combination of variables,
as shown in Table 1's sample of state provisions.

See Kramer, 1 Legal Rights of Children § 15:1 at 1074 (cited in note 2).
Katz, Schroeder, and Sidman, 7 Fam L Q at 212-13 (cited in note 11). Early
common law emancipation developed to protect minors against claims by their parents to
their wages. See, for example, Lackman v Wood, 25 Cal 147, 151 (1864).
18 See Carol Sanger and Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U Mich J L Ref 239, 251 (1992) (claiming that until the first
wave of emancipation statutes, "[t]he phrase 'emancipation of a minor', as applied to
agreements of parent and child, appears to have been rather loosely used").
16
17

19

Id at 245.

States that lack emancipation statutes are: Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin.
21
Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 356 (cited in note 5).
20

The University of Chicago Law Review

1804

[80:1799

TABLE 1. VARIABLES IN SELECTED STATE EmANCIPATION
STATUTES

Statte

Illinois: 750
ILCS 30/1
et seq
(2003)

Maine:
15 Me Rev
Stat Ann
§ 3506-A
(1981)
North
Carolina:
NC Gen
Stat Ann
§ 7B-3500
et seq

Who
Can

Requirements
and

Initiate

Considerations

Parent
or child

Child
only

Child
only

Effects

No objection from
minor or parent;
minor "has
demonstrated the
ability ... to
manage his own
affairs and to live

Rights of
persons of
age of
majority,
with
specific
age-based

... independent

exceptions

of his parents"
Child living apart
from
parents; juvenile
has made
provisions for self
and is
mature; minor's
best interest
Family discord
and rejection of
supervision;
minor's best
interest

Procedure
Petition,
notice,
hearing,
appeal

No legal
effects
stated in
the
statute

Petition,
possible
mediation,
hearing,
order,
appeals

Adult
status for
petitioner
and relief
of duties
of parent

Petition,
summons,
hearing,
decree,
appeals

Minor is
"considered as

Petition by
minor,
notice to

being over

parents,

age of
majority
for one or
more of
the
[stated]

court may
issue
declaration
of emancipation with
factual

purposes"

findings

(1999)

ew
NM Shild
An S
An § A
19eseq[is]

Chi-onld
ony

Minor is
"willingly living
....
apart from his
parents, . . . is
managing his own
financial
affairs and ... it
in the
minor's best
interest"
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Though the variables are similar from statute to statute, the
substantive details of emancipation vary widely. With respect to
the standards for emancipation, present statutes range from a
broad "best interest of the minor" test 2 2 to a large set of specific
criteria that attempts to capture what considerations should go
into a best-interests evaluation.23 Similarly, the statutes vary in
their specificity of the procedures for emancipation24 and in the
rights granted by emancipation.
State rules also differ regarding who may initiate emancipation. In some states, either the parent or the child can initiate
the process, while other states only allow child-initiated emancipation.25 Commentators have stressed the need for emancipation
statutes to protect parents in addition to children, arguing that
"[p]arents are also people with rights who may themselves be
the victims of discord created by a child's extreme antisocial behavior"26 and "[t]hat emancipation of a minor may benefit the
parents does not necessarily make it a bad thing."27
On the other hand, one critique of emancipation is its potential to be abused by parents. Critics contend that parents can
use "unilateral" emancipation to escape their duties of support

by abandoning their children.28 Restricting the initiation of
emancipation to children only is one potential line of defense

against this abuse. However, even in states with child-only
emancipation, there is a concern that parents still play a large
role in encouraging emancipation. Parents may push their children to initiate emancipation procedures when the relationship

is less than harmonious.29

22 See, for example, Mich Comp Laws Ann § 722.4c(2); Tex Fam Code Ann § 31.005;
Ala Code Ann § 26-13-1 (Bender 2009).
23 See, for example, NC Gen Stat Ann § 7B-3504. See
also H. Jeffrey Gottesfeld,
Comment, The Uncertain Status of the Emancipated Minor: Why We Need a Uniform
Statutory Emancipationof Minors Act (USEMA), 15 USF L Rev 473, 486-87 (1981).
24 Compare Fla Stat Ann § 743.015(2)(d) (West 2010) (requiring that the minor
must submit a statement of character) with 15 Me Rev Stat Ann § 3506-A (West 2003)
(describing only limited procedural requirements for an emancipation petition).
25 See Table 1.
26 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 372 (cited in note 5).
27 S. Elise Kert, Should EmancipationBe for Adolescents or for Parents?,16
J Contemp Legal Issues 307, 309 (2007).
28 Ilse Nehring, 'Throwaway Rights'" Empowering a Forgotten Minority, 18 Whittier L Rev 767, 775 (1997).
29 See Kert, 16 J Contemp Legal Issues at 308 (cited in note 27) (noting that emancipation might "prove a windfall for a parent who has little or no control over a teenager").
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B. Child Support: Background, Statutes, and Theories
Child support is money that a "particular parent is ordered
to pay for [a] child's basic, necessary living expenses, namely
food, clothing, and shelter."30 The diverse origins of child support
obligations include "common law, state poor laws, divorce codes,
bastardy laws, and criminal nonsupport laws."3' The purposes
were equally varied, ranging from reimbursing local governments for public aid to discouraging out-of-wedlock births.32
Today, child support is a term in family law referring specifically to a transfer of income from a noncustodial parent to support the expenses of the child's care. 33 Private support refers to
funding from a nonresident parent; public support is paid for by
the government. 34 A parent's duty of support continues during
the child's minority, or, in some states, until the child graduates
from high school.36
Child support has a federal statutory source in Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act.36The statute demands that every state

that receives Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
funds37 must establish a child support agency.38 This state agency is obligated to help the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) to meet its collection goals.3 The statute also
30 Nichols, 547 S2d at 769. See also General FAQs (California Department of Child
Support Services 2011), online at http://www.childsup.ca.gov/home/generalfaqs.aspx (visited Nov 24, 2013).

31 Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
Interests of Children to the FiscalInterests of the State, 42 Wake Forest L Rev 1029, 1034

(2007).
32
33

Id.
Irwin Garfinkel, The Child-Support Revolution, 84 Am Econ Rev 81, 81 (May

1994).
Id.
See, for example, Kan Stat Ann § 23-3001(b) (stating that the duty of support
lasts until the child graduates high school).
36 Social Services Amendments of 1974 § 101(a), Pub L No 93-647, 88 Stat 2337,
2351, codified as amended at 42 USC § 651 et seq.
37 TANF replaced a similar program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996. See Office of Family Assistance, TANF-ACF-PI-2004-03 (Use of
34

35

TANF Funds to Recover Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Overpayments) (Department of Health and Human Services July 14, 2004), online at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programsofa/resource/policy/pi-ofa/2004/pi2004-3htm (visited Nov 24,
2013).
38 See 42 USC § 602(a)(2) (defining "eligible state" as having, among other requirements, certified that the state will "operate a child support enforcement program").
39 The child support program was established by Congress in 1975 and underwent
significant reforms following welfare reform legislation in 1996. See Office of Child Support Enforcement, OCSE Fact Sheet (Department of Health and Human Services), online
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/ocse-fact-sheet (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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requires that individual parents applying for assistance must
establish mechanisms to collect funds from noncustodial
parents. 40
The federal government mandates the development of numerical support guidelines, initiates reforms to collection methods, and often pays for uncollected obligations.41 However, each
state is left to make its own law regarding such decisions as
methods of collection.42 Unlike emancipation statutes, there is
fairly widespread consistency among states. Almost all states
have embraced a continuity-of-expenditure approach, by which
support obligations are calculated using a formula designed to
estimate what the child's expenses would have been had the
family remained intact.43 Four others have followed a policy
driven by the goals of poverty prevention, an approach first embraced in Delaware.4 This approach uses a formula to establish
minimum "primary support" values to meet the needs of an
adult and one or more children, and then calculates parental
contribution to this target in proportion to each parent's
income.45
Overall, the current child support system is described as
having "mixed" incentives.46 It considers best interests of the
child and family a primary objective. However, the state also
foots a huge bill in welfare payments to children that would
have been covered by support obligations from noncustodial parents if a proper support order had been in place. Thus, collecting
from these parents to reimburse the state remains a significant

priority.47

40 See Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 31). See also Laura W.
Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 Fam L Q 365, 367-69 (2008).
41
See Garrison, 86 Cal L Rev at 54 (cited in note 2).
42 Ira Mark Ellman and Tara O'Toole Elman, The Theory of Child Support, 45
Harv J Leg 107, 113 & n 22 (2008).
43 Garrison, 86 Cal L Rev at 60-61 (cited in note 2) (noting that all but five states
embraced the continuity-of-expenditure approach in adopting their child support guidelines). See also, for example, Voishan v Palma, 609 A2d 319, 321 (Md 1992) ("The conceptual underpinning [of Maryland's child-support guidelines] is that a child should receive the same proportion of parental income, and thereby enjoy the standard of living,
he or she would have experienced had the child's parents remained together.").
44 Garrison, 86 Cal L Rev at 61 & n 106 (cited in note 2) (noting that Delaware,
Hawaii, Montana, and West Virginia have adopted a poverty prevention formula in their
guidelines).
45 Id at 61.
46 Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1048-51 (cited in note 31).
47 See id at 1051.
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Critics have argued that the government's fiscal interests
often conflict with the best interests of the children.48 Stating
that the current child support system developed from "competing interests and purposes," one commentator identified the tensions that these two objectives of child support create. 49 For example, the state requires a mother receiving welfare to establish
a child support order to collect from the noncustodial father of
her child. These funds will go to the government and will serve
the government's interest of welfare reimbursement.so However,
the mother may have reasons why it is not in the best interests
of the child to have the father involved. She may not want her
child to know his father or may fear domestic violence or retaliation.51 But the alternative of noncooperation may result in the
termination of her welfare payments. Because of this undesirable tension, the commentator advocated for an abandonment of
the government-reimbursement function in favor of a greater focus on the maintenance of families and their economic
self-sufficiency.52
C.

The Relationship between Emancipation and Child Support

It is a widely held proposition that a court finding of emancipation terminates any support obligation of a parent.5 3 The logic is that a minor's reliance on parental support "indicates continued financial dependence."54 If a child cannot demonstrate

financial independence, under most statutes, the child will not
meet the standards for emancipation.55 Conversely, if the court
finds that the child is financially independent, then a support
order will not be necessary.56

See, for example, id at 1032-33.
Id at 1032-34.
50 Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 31).
51
Id at 1045-46.
52 See id at 1045-46, 1079-82.
53
See Garrison, 86 Cal L Rev at 51 (cited in note 2); Kramer, 1 Legal Rights of
Children § 15:9 at 543 (cited in note 2). It is important to note that this Comment addresses two kinds of support obligations: child support (state orders to noncustodial parents) and more general parental support (the statutory duty of parents to support their
minor children). The widely held proposition is that both duties are extinguished upon
emancipation.
54 Castle, 20 Fain L Q at 351 (cited in note 5).
55
See notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
56 Note that "financial independence" is also sometimes referred to as "financial
responsibility" or "financial self-sufficiency." The general formulation given by Professor
Dana F. Castle is a measure of "the ability of the child to provide for her/himself without
parental assistance." Castle, 20 Fain L Q at 370 (cited in note 5). However, Professor
48
49
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However, as with other aspects of emancipation, the statutes differ regarding what happens to a support obligation when
a child is emancipated. Within the states that have emancipation statutes, variation exists in the legal effects of emancipation
on support. Several states do not mention child support in their
emancipation statutes.57 Other states decree that a child support
order does not automatically terminate upon emancipation, but
it may be terminated at the discretion of the judge.58 One state,
Michigan, goes even further, requiringby statute that a parent
will continue to be financially liable for an emancipated minor59
Additionally, several states demand that divorced or unmarried
parents continue to support their children's college expenses,
even beyond the age of majority.60
Most commonly, statutes explicitly list the purposes for
which the minor will be considered emancipated, and these lists
include the termination of support by the minor's parents.6 '
However, language varies as to whether the emancipated minor
must be considered emancipated for all of the listed purposes, or
whether a judge may choose among the listed purposes for a
particular emancipation.62
This distinction stems from a textual difference in the statutes. Some states say that a child shall be emancipated "for all
purposes that result from reaching the age of majority."63 This
has been referred to as "all-or-nothing" emancipation, meaning a
petition for emancipation terminates all parental obligations to
the child. Other states' language is more flexible, providing that
Castle notes that some courts have looked more to the child's future capability to provide
for himself as opposed to his current demonstration of independence. Id.
57 See, for example, Alaska Stat Ann § 09.55.590 (Lexis 2012); 15 Me Rev Stat Ann
§ 3506-A (West 2003); Tex Fam Code Ann § 31.006. In some states, including those without emancipation statutes, the child support statute lists emancipation as a terminating
event for a child support order. See Colo Rev Stat Ann § 14-10-115(13); Ga Code Ann
§ 19-6-15(e); Minn Stat Ann § 518A.39 (subd 5); Neb Rev Stat § 42-371.01(1).
58 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 9-27-362(e)(10); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 403.213.(3).
Nev Rev Stat Ann § 129.130.4 states that a parental support obligation will be terminated, but the judge has the option to provide for its continuation by decree.
59 Mich Comp Laws Ann § 722.4e(2).
60 See notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
61 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 12-2454.B; Cal Fam Code § 7050(a); NC
Gen Stat Ann § 7B-3507(2); 12 Vt Stat Ann § 7156(a)(6); Va Code Ann § 16.1-334.12;
Wash Rev Code Ann § 13.64.060(1)(a).
62 Compare 12 Vt Stat Ann § 7156(a) (noting that a child is emancipated for "all
purposes") with Wash Rev Code Ann § 13.64.060(1) (noting that a child is emancipated
for certain enumerated purposes, but the emancipation is not limited to those purposes).
63 12 Vt Stat Ann § 7156(a). See also Fla Stat Ann § 743.015(7) (West 2010); NC
Gen Stat Ann § 7B-3507(1); Va Code § 16.1-334; Nev Rev Stat § 129.130.
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a child shall be emancipated "for the purposes of, but not limited
to [the following]" or "for one or more of the purposes enumerated."64 Even those states that lack emancipation statutes recognize judicial emancipations, and those states mostly list "emancipation" in the child support statutes as an event that will
terminate child support.5 Listing emancipation as a trigger for
the end of child support is fairly common across state child support statutes, regardless of whether the state has an emancipation statute or not.
Many commentators reiterate the conventional view that
emancipation and continued support of the child are incompatible.66 However, Professor Sanford N. Katz, Professor William A.
Schroeder, and Lawrence R. Sidman wrote in 1973 that courts
were, in some circumstances, willing to grant "partial emancipation" by which a child would be able to "assert rights normally
incident to complete emancipation while still able to enforce parental obligations."67 But case law provides "imprecise guidance"
on one manifestation of partial emancipation: the relationship
between child support and emancipation.8
One commentator argued strongly for continued parental
support in the case of "throwaway children," defined as "abandoned children . . . [and children] whose parents make no effort
to get them back after they run away."69 She claimed that in

these situations, parents unilaterally benefit from abandoning
their children and that such children should therefore be able to
be emancipated while continuing to receive parental support. 70
She compared this process to "rehabilitative alimony" in a

64 Wash Rev Code Ann § 13.64.060(1); NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-4. See also Mont
Code Ann § 41-1-503(2).
65 See, for example, NH Rev Stat Ann § 461-A:14; NJ Stat Ann § 2A:34-23.a; NY
Fam Law § 413.1(b)(2).
66 See, for example, Sanger and Willemsen, 25 U Mich J L Ref at 299 (cited in note
18) (noting that "emancipation provides parents with two financial benefits otherwise
unavailable until the child reaches majority. It ends the parents' support obligation and
limits their legal liability for their child's conduct").
67 Katz, Schroeder, and Sidman, 7 Fam L Q at 215 (cited in note 11). See also
Gottesfeld, Comment, 15 USF L Rev at 494 (cited in note 23) (noting that "[h]istorically,
courts could emancipate minors for either all purposes or for limited purposes").
68 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 350-51 (cited in note 5).
69 Nehring, 18 Whittier L Rev at 770 (cited in note 28).
70 Id at 775, 805-10 (arguing that "when a minor is evicted from the home by a
unilateral act of the parent, the parents should be required, by law, to make support
payments").
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divorce,71 in that the support would only continue temporarily
until the child had reached the age of majority.72
Professor Katz, Professor Schroeder, and Sidman criticized
this vision of partial emancipation as "a doctrine for children,
enabling a minor to vindicate certain rights that he would otherwise be barred from asserting, yet cloaking him with the continuing protection afforded by parental obligations."73 They referred to this as the "hav[ing] their cake and eat[ing] it" view of
emancipation and child support.74 Other academics have been
similarly hostile. Professors Carol Sanger and Eleanor Willemsen urged that emancipation should be thought of like a waiver:
the child gains emancipation while relinquishing his statutory
entitlement to financial support by his parents.75
Against this backdrop of competing theories of emancipation
and child support, it is no surprise that legislatures have drafted
different statutory schemes addressing whether and how emancipation ends a duty of support. Further, courts interpreting
these laws have reached different conclusions-even when analyzing different cases governed by the same state statute. Part II
identifies cases that have confronted these questions.
II. EmANCIPATION AND CHILD SUPPORT CASES: TRADITIONAL
AND NONTRADITIONAL APPROACHES BY COURTS

The traditional notion that emancipation and child support
are mutually exclusive is still the most accepted.7< Accordingly,
decisions break down into unsurprising patterns. In many cases,
courts have found no emancipation of the child and a consequent
continuation of support; in a somewhat smaller number of cases,
courts have found emancipation and no continuation of support.

71 Rehabilitative alimony is "alimony payable for a short but specific and terminable period of time, which will cease when the recipient is, with reasonable efforts, selfsupporting." David H. Kelsey and Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship between Permanent
and RehabilitativeAlimony, 4 J Am Acad Matrim Law 1, 1-2 (1988).
72 Nehring, 18 Whittier L Rev at 807 (cited in note 28).
73 Katz, Schroeder, and Sidman, 7 Fam L Q at 227 (cited in note 11).
74 Id. See also Gottesfeld, Comment, 15 USF L Rev at 500 (cited in note 23) ("[Ilf a
minor is to be emancipated for beneficial purposes, the minor should be prepared to face
some of the disadvantages of adulthood as well.").
75
Sanger and Willemsen, 25 U Mich J L Ref at 328-29 (cited in note 18).
76 See Rebecca E. Hatch, Proof of the Emancipation of Child in Order to Terminate
Child Support, Am Juris Proof of Facts 3d § 1 (2009).
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Rejecting the traditional view, one court recently found both
emancipation and a continuation of child support.77
A. The Traditional Approach: Emancipation Terminates Child
Support
Courts are hesitant to grant emancipation if there is an indication of continued financial need on the part of the child.78
One common way this situation arises is in cases that involve a
claim by a parent to nullify the parent's child support obligations. The parent typically argues that the child was so estranged as to warrant a declaration of emancipation.79
In Tew v Tew,so the child's father sought to modify his child
support obligations by declaring the child emancipated against
the wishes of the custodial mother.81 The court held that the
child should not be emancipated, even though she was employed.82 The child was held to be incapable of supporting her
own finances and thus could not meet the statutory requirements for emancipation.83
Cases from other states follow the same pattern.84 It is
largely inconsequential whether a state has an emancipation
statute; in either situation, a court will examine the child's alleged estrangement from the parents and ability to support himself. In each case following this pattern, the court held that the
77 Again, it is worth stressing the two related support obligations potentially at issue. The previous Section discussed language in the statutes about whether existing
child support orders, as well as general parental duties of support, are extinguished upon a child's emancipation. This Part analyzes cases in which courts have grappled with
the same questions.
78 See Katz, Schroeder, and Sidman, 7 Fam L Q at 225-26 (cited in note 11).
79 Some cases also involve a noncustodial parent seeking reimbursement for child
support paid to the custodial parent following the child's emancipation. Courts generally
grant this request under the traditional view that emancipation terminates a child support obligation. See, for example, Rohner v Long, 57 SW3d 920, 923 (Mo App 2001).
s0 924 NE2d 1262 (Ind App 2010).
81 Id at 1264. Indiana's child support statute, Ind Code Ann § 31-16-6-6, provides
several means by which a child may be deemed emancipated and support cut off. Under
section 6(b)(3), the child may be considered emancipated if she is "not under the care or
control of . . . either parent." Separately, under § 6(a)(3), the child may be considered
emancipated for the purposes of support if she is over eighteen, not enrolled in school,
and capable of supporting herself through employment. The Tew court did not address
Indiana's free-standing emancipation statute, Ind Code Ann § 31-34-20-6, in its opinion.
82 Tew, 924 NE2d at 1266-67.
83

Id at 1267.

84 See, for example, Anderson v Loper, 689 S2d 118, 120 (Ala Civ App 1996); Thomas B. v Lydia D., 886 NYS2d 22, 26-27 (NY App 2009); Purdy v Purdy, 578 SE2d 30, 31
(SC App 2003).
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child could not be emancipated due to his or her lack of financial
self-sufficiency. Thus, the court ordered a continuation of child
support.
In a smaller number of cases, courts have held that a child
was sufficiently independent to be legally emancipated. Consistent with the traditional approach, these courts terminated
the child support order following their finding of emancipation.
In the New York case Labanowski v Labanowski,85 the father

sought to dismiss his support obligations to his children, who
had allegedly estranged themselves from him.86 The appellate
court held that the father's claim could not be dismissed, concluding that "a child of employable age, who actively abandons
the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation,
without cause, may be deemed to have forfeited his or her right
to support" and remanding for a full hearing on whether the estrangement was unjustified.87
There are many more cases in which states have ruled on
what constitutes emancipation for the purposes of continuing or
severing a child support obligation8 Similarly, various treatises
have summarized the factual situations under which courts
have and have not found minors to be emancipated8 However,
these cases proceeded under the assumption that emancipation
ends a child support obligation. In essence, the inquiry is a onestep process: whether the child is emancipated determines
whether the child will continue to receive support.
In sum, the emancipation cases fall neatly into a pattern, either granting emancipation or granting child support. While
states have markedly different laws on emancipation and child
85
86

857 NYS2d 737 (NY App 2008).
Id at 739.
Id at 740 (quotation marks omitted). See also McKay v McKay, 644 NE2d 164,

87
168 (Ind App 1994) (holding that a twenty-year-old son's refusal to interact with his father was sufficient ground for terminating the father's responsibility to pay child support); Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 351 (cited in note 5) ("Usually, where a child voluntarily
leaves home without parental permission even though the parent is willing to support
the child within the family household, a court will terminate the parent's support
obligation.").
88 See, for example, Cure v Cure, 767 NE2d 997, 1002 (Ind App 2002) (holding that
a father could not declare his daughter emancipated for the purpose of relieving his child
support obligation); Dowell v Dowell, 73 SW3d 709, 717 (Mo App 2002) (holding that a

daughter was emancipated and her father's child support obligation was discharged);
Ragan v Ragan, 931 SW2d 888, 891 (Mo App 1996).
89 See generally, for example, Morgan, 12 Divorce Litig 1 (cited in note 15); Alice M.
Wright, What Voluntary Acts of Child, Other than Marriageor Entry into Military Service, Terminate Parent'sObligationto Support, 55 ALR5th 557 (1998).
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support-ranging from no statutes to explicit and detailed statutes-state court decisions have nonetheless been largely consistent. These cases, for the most part, do not examine the individual state's statutory language in great detail to determine
whether emancipation and child support should perhaps continue to coexist in an individual case. Instead, they rely upon the
traditional understanding that emancipation and child support
are mutually exclusive.
There is, however, one interesting caveat: the cases hint in
dicta at reasoning that would support an erosion of this bright
line. In Tew, the court noted that full emancipation is not required for a child support order to be modified because "[u]nder
certain circumstances, repudiation [of the parental relationship]
will obviate a parent's obligation to pay certain expenses for a
child."9o By contrast, in Labanowski, the court distinguished
cases in which the children voluntarily withdrew themselves
from their parent from cases in which the severance of the relationship was due to the "parent's malfeasance, misconduct, neglect, or abuse."91 In the latter cases, prior courts have refused to
relieve parents of support obligations.92
Courts have thus implied that they are willing to make decisions based on the actions of the child and parent, irrespective
of a formal emancipation decision-that is, they will end child
support in the case of willing child repudiation, and they will
continue child support obligations in the case of parental malfeasance. But no case-until July 2012-explicitly used this reasoning to break down the statutory emancipation-child support
wall.
B. A New Approach: Emancipation and Continued Child
Support
One recent case has broken the trend, allowing a form of
statutory partial emancipation by which the child was deemed
emancipated but retained the right to seek child support from
90 Tew, 924 NE2d at 1269. Tew reasoned that "adult children who willfully abandon
a parent must be deemed to have run the risk that such a parent may not be willing to
underwrite their educational pursuits." Id, quoting McKay, 644 NE2d at 167.
91 Labanowski, 857 NYS2d at 740.
92 See Thomas B., 886 NYS2d at 26 (noting the rule that self-emancipation due to a
child's willing abandonment of the parent requires that the abandonment "not [be] the
result of actions on the part of the parent"); Wiegert v Wiegert, 699 NYS2d 597, 598 (NY
App 1999) (noting the same for a case of abuse); Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 602 NYS2d 623,
631 (NY App 1993) (noting the same for a case of neglect).
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her mother. In Diamond, the district court described Jhette Diamond as a "'classic case' for emancipation": she left the troubled home of her mother and was thriving independently while
living with foster parents. 3
The lower court investigated the requirements for emancipation under the New Mexico Emancipation of Minors Act.94
This Act states, in relevant part about the general grant of
emancipation power:
Any person sixteen years of age or older may be declared an
emancipated minor for one or more of the purposes enumerated in the Emancipation of Minors Act if he is willingly living separate and apart from his parents, guardian or custodian, is managing his own financial affairs and the court
finds it in the minor's best interest.95
In Jhette Diamond's case, the court found each of these conditions met.96
The district court then ruled on Jhette's motion for continued support from her mother, finding that it was possible to
award support even after emancipation. The court order of
emancipation thus stated that Jhette was "an emancipated minor in all respects, except that she shall retain the right to support from [her mother]."97 The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "New Mexico law does not permit a minor
emancipated pursuant to the [Emancipation of Minors Act] to
collect child support payments" and that a court may not "pick
and choose the purposes for which a child is emancipated."98
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Mexico examined the
plain language and legislative purpose of the Act. This Act, first
adopted in 1981 and recodified in 1995, was passed in response
to a call for a legislative statement of emancipation and its consequences.9 9 It sets forth requirements for a petitioner seeking
emancipation and a procedural mechanism for a minor to obtain
a declaration of emancipation.oo
Regarding the effects of emancipation, the Act states:

93

Diamond, 283 P3d at 261.

94

NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-1 et seq.
NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-4.
Diamond, 283 P3d at 261.
Id at 263.
Diamond v Diamond, 245 P3d 578, 579, 582 (NM App 2010).
Diamond, 283 P3d at 264.
See id at 264-65; NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-7(A).

95
96

97
98
99
100
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An emancipated minor shall be considered as being over the
age of majority for one or more of the following purposes:
(A) consenting to medical, dental or psychiatric care without
parental consent, knowledge or liability;
(B) his capacity to enter into a binding contract;
(D) his right to support by his parents;
(F) establishing his own residence;
(G) buying or selling real property.101
The court examined the phrase "one or more of the following
purposes" to determine whether it would permit a court to craft
an emancipation order tailored to include only those effects of
emancipation that support the best interests of the child.102 The
court ruled in the affirmative, notwithstanding the statute's requirement that the child be managing his own financial affairs
as a precondition for emancipation.oa Holding that "[it did] not
see management of one's financial affairs and entitlement to

support as inherently contradictory," the court allowed a child to
be legally emancipated while still requiring her mother to support her financially.104 The court found textual support for this
result in the use of the disjunctive "or" in the phrase "one or
more of the following purposes."10s
Similarly, the court determined the Act's provision that a
child be "managing his own financial affairs" need not mean
that a child was completely economically self-sufficient.10 Under
this reading, a child could be emancipated without a showing of
total self-sufficiency, leaving the court to determine whether
continuation or establishment of a child support order was
appropriate.107

The court based its interpretation of the statute on an investigation of "managing [one's] financial affairs" in other types of
cases, such as guardianship, conservatorship proceedings, and
spousal support. 08 In guardianship and conservatorship

101 NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-5.
102 Diamond, 283 P3d at 266-67.
103 See text accompanying notes 95-96.
104 Diamond, 283 P3d at 267.
105 Id at 266 (emphasis added).
106 Id at 267.
107 Id.
108 Diamond, 283 P3d at 267-68.
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proceedings, the phrase is used to refer to the individual's capacity and ability to manage his affairs, as opposed to his economic
self-sufficiency.o9 Further, the court noted that in spousal support cases, the spouse may be very well able to manage her own
affairs and still be entitled to support."o The court thus viewed
the use of "managing [one's] own financial affairs" in the emancipation statute to be (1) defined as the ability to self-support,
not the means to do so; and (2) not contradicted by a continued
entitlement to support. The court also observed that the Act's
provision that the minor could continue to receive public assistance worked against the notion that a minor must be exclusively self-supporting to be emancipated."'
The court bolstered its reasoning with a study of the legislative purpose of the Act, which was to provide flexibility to tailor
emancipation orders to suit the best interests of the child.112 Finally, the court looked to cases in New Mexico and other states
that predate the passage of the Emancipation of Minors Act, finding evidence that courts would grant common law partial emancipations while continuing the parents' support obligations.13
Diamond thus raises the following question: Should there be
such a thing as limited statutory emancipation when it comes to
child support? The next Part examines this question, primarily
in the context of states that have emancipation statutes, but also with application to those states that have common law emancipation only.
III. WHY COURTS CAN-AND SHOULD-FOLLOW DIAMOND
Diamond unsettled the question of whether statutory emancipation must terminate or preclude a child support order in the
absence of explicit language to the contrary. This Comment
finds several avenues of support for the claim that Diamond
should not be an outlier, and that the court's grant of partial

109 See id at 267.
110 Id at 267-68.
111 Id at 268.

See Diamond, 283 P3d at 266-67.
See id at 269-71. See also, for example, Fevig a Fevig, 559 P2d 839, 841 (NM
1977) (holding that "there was a partial emancipation of [the minors] with respect to
their parents' right to discipline and care for them," but without extinguishing the parents' duty of support).
112

113
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statutory emancipation while continuing child support should
provide instruction to other judges.114
This Part first looks to the broad purposes behind emancipation and child support statutes and to the interpretation of
similar statutes in the child custody and nonemancipation support contexts. Next, it discusses ways in which emancipation
does not provide a bright line for the termination of parental obligations; in several areas, parents remain liable and responsible
for their emancipated minors. Finally, it examines changed circumstances in families and the liberalization of family-law policies over the last fifty years.
Concluding that there are ample grounds to support a decision that an emancipation order should not automatically terminate a child support obligation, this Part then examines the
likelihood that judges in different states will adopt this rationale. It ends with a proposal for a totality-of-circumstances
approach that would advise when continuing child support
would be warranted in an individual case.
A.

The Purposes behind Emancipation and Child Support
Statutes

This Section examines the similarities among state emancipation statutes and argues that Diamond is applicable outside
New Mexico. State legislatures considered their respective
emancipation and child support statutes to have similar goals:
serving the best interests of the child and providing a financially
sound solution to the state.116
1. Best interests of the child.
Though emancipation statutes vary greatly, they nearly always demand that a declaration of emancipation should only be
granted if it is in the minor's best interest.116 The Diamond court
114 The Comment's solution speaks broadly to the notion of general postemancipation support and is not limited to the situations in which a child support obligation was already in place. As in Diamond, a party seeking emancipation may also move
for the establishment of a child support order, assuming the court determines that a duty of parental support continues.
115 For a discussion of differences among individual states in the appropriateness of
applying a Diamond-like interpretation in a particular state given the differing statutes,
see Part III.E.
116 See, for example, Ala Code Ann § 26-13-1 (Bender 2009); Cal Fam Code
§ 7122(a); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 46b-150b; NM Stat Ann § 32A-21-4; 12 VT Stat Ann
§ 7155(a). Connecticut's statute is unique in that it demands merely that emancipation
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noted that the New Mexico Legislature specifically added this
requirement prior to enactment.117 The court found "persuasive
indications of the Legislature's intent that district courts should
tailor emancipation orders to the best interests of the minor in
each particular case."118 The existence of identical best-interests

language in other state statutes suggests that this reasoning
should not be limited to New Mexico. This should come as no
surprise: the best-interests-of-the-child standard is common
throughout family law, appearing in custody, abuse, neglect, and
paternity cases.n 9

The standard is also relevant in the child support context.
Although the legislative debate over the federal child support
statute was described as limited and confused,120 several scholars and courts have argued that child support is also primarily
predicated on serving the best interests of the child.121 Further,
the Office of Child Support Enforcement includes this phrase as
part of its mission and demands that state agencies keep this objective in mind.122
Courts have interpreted the best-interests language in
emancipation statutes to mean that emancipation should not be
granted if the child is not financially self-sufficient, and would
be better off remaining financially supported and unemancipated. But coupled with the idea that child support is also designed
to serve the child's best interest, courts could justifiably conclude that, in some cases, the child's best interest would best be

be in the best interest of the minor, any child of the minor, or the parents or guardian of
the minor.
117 Diamond, 283 P3d at 267.
118 Id at 266-67. See also id at 271 (noting that "[i]t is well-settled law that when [a]
case involves children, the trial court has broad authority to fashion its rulings in [the]
best interests of the children") (quotation marks omitted).
119 See Jason M. Merrill, Note, Falling through the Cracks: DistinguishingParental
Rights from Parental Obligations in Cases Involving Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship, 11 J L & Fam Stud 203, 207 (2008) (observing that, especially in the case
of abuse and neglect, "[n]early every jurisdiction provides that the best interests of the
child are the number one priority in parental termination proceedings").
120 See Garrison, 86 Cal L Rev at 91 (cited in note 2).
121 See Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1032-33 (cited in note 31).
122 See, for example, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Requests for Locate Services, Referrals, and Electronic Interface (Department of Health and Human Services
2012), online at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/requests-for-locate-services
-referrals-and-electronic-interface (visited Nov 24, 2013) (noting that state child support
and welfare agencies can work together "so that child support services may be provided
in appropriate cases and tailored to the needs of individual families in the best interests
of the child").
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served by both emancipation and continued parental support. 123
Given that both emancipation and child support statutes share
the goal of furthering children's best interests, granting postemancipation child support may be the most faithful way to further this joint legislative purpose.
2. Financial soundness.
A secondary goal of emancipation and child support statutes
was creating a system that would not impose a large financial
burden on the state. For example, the sponsors of the bill that
led to California's emancipation statute 24 promised that more
frequent emancipation would not cost the state additional money.125 The focus in nearly every emancipation statute on ensuring that the minor is financially secure before granting emancipation serves this legislative goal of avoiding a financial burden.
State legislatures wanted to be confident that, by establishing
emancipation statutes, they would not be merely transferring
the costs of dependent children from their parents to the state.
Similarly, as discussed in Part I.B, a longstanding stated intent of the federal child support program was to force parents to
reimburse the government for welfare payments.126 One mission
of the child support movement was to support the popular societal view that both parents, as opposed to the state, have the
primary obligation to support their child.127
Requiring that emancipated children be capable of managing their own affairs and allowing post-emancipation child support would help ensure that emancipated children will not become dependent on state support. Financial responsibility, far
from being inconsistent with continued support, might instead
be contingent upon it. Recall that some state statutes "have used
capability and not accomplishment as the measure [of financial
independence]."128 The Diamond court also found that "managing
123 This argument is even stronger in cases in which children are seeking emancipation due to parental malfeasance or neglect.
124 Cal Fam Code § 7000 et seq.
125 See Sanger and Willemsen, 25 U Mich J L Ref at 256 (cited in note 18) (noting
that the alternative to emancipation is often expensive state-run foster care).
126 See notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
127 See Morgan, 42 Fam L Q at 367 (cited in note 40) (noting the Congress-induced
shift in the burden of support from the public to the private sphere).
128 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 370 (cited in note 5). See also Utah Code Ann § 78A-6-803
(noting that the minor must be "capable of living independently" and "capable of managing his or her own financial affairs").
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[one's] financial affairs" referred to an individual's capability,
and not his means, to self-support.129 This definition is consistent

with the goal of avoiding costs to the state. Indeed, the child
seeking emancipation would be incentivized to demonstrate the
ability to manage his financial affairs if doing so would mean he
has a chance of emancipation while retaining support from his
parents. Requiring the combination of financial responsibility
and continued parental support may in fact be the most financially feasible option for the state, consistent with the statutory
goals.

The emancipation-child support question fuses two sets of
statutes: the state statutes on child support orders and the state
statutes on emancipation. A hybrid approach, allowing both
emancipation and continued child support, might be costeffective while serving the best interests of the child. Moreover,
as will be discussed below, this approach is consistent with the
application of similar statutes concerning the obligations of
parents whose rights have been terminated, as well as with
those concerning the rights of parents who are behind on their
obligations.
B.

Parental Rights and Obligations Are Already Separated

The notion that parental rights and obligations are reciprocal-meaning, if one terminates, so does the other-has already
been undercut in several areas of family law. In both child custody and child support situations, courts have recognized that a
parent's obligations may continue even after his rights are severed. Post-emancipation child support conceptually fits with this
new pattern.
1. Child custody.
Similar to the emancipation and child support question, a
split exists among states as to whether termination of parental
rights by the state-due to neglect or abuse-also terminates a
child support obligation. Traditionally, the rights and obligations of parenthood were viewed as joined; one author noted that
"[t]he majority of courts hold that parental rights and parental
129 Diamond, 283 P3d at 267. See also Part II.B.
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obligations are reciprocal in nature."130 The logic is that, if the

parent is losing the right to custody, to visitation, and to control
the child's training and education, the child should likewise lose
the right to support. The best-interests explanation is that a
child's relationship with an abusive parent cannot be totally
severed if a payment relationship continues to exist.131
For example, in Ponton v Tabares,132 a court terminated a
father's parental rights after allegations of sexual abuse.133 The
court then granted his petition to relieve his child support obligation, finding that a severance of all ties to an abusive parent
was in the child's best interest.13 The opinion stated that other
jurisdictions similarly had held that an "obligation to pay child
support ended when [the] parental rights were terminated."'>
However, a wave of states is "beginning to stray from [ ] the
majority rule that parental rights and obligations are reciprocal."136 Two cases highlight an increased willingness to diverge
from this traditional approach. In Michigan, one court recently
noted that the plain language of the relevant statute does not
associate parental obligations with parental rights; instead "the
statutory structure indicates the Legislature's determination
that parental rights are distinct from parental obligations, and
nothing in the statutory structure indicates that the loss of parental rights automatically results in the loss of parental obligations."137 There, the court held that the parent had no authority
for the claim that he was entitled to have his child support obligation suspended when his parental rights terminated.138
A lower panel in this case had articulated that the goal of
terminating parental rights was to "protect the child."139 The
court noted that cutting off child support upon the termination
of parental rights would not protect the child from additional
harm from his parent. Additionally, the court worried that ending support obligations upon a finding of abuse may create a
perverse disincentive to report abusive behavior if such a report
130 Merrill, Note, 11 J L & Fan Stud at 204 (cited in note 119).
131 Id at 207-08.
132 711 S2d 125 (Fla App 1998).
133 Id at 126.
134

Id.

135 Id.

136 Merrill, Note, 11 J L & Fam Stud at 209 (cited in note 119).
137 In re Beck, 793 NW2d 562, 563-64 (Mich 2010).
138 Id at 565.
139 In re Beck, 788 NW2d 697, 700 (Mich App 2010).
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would mean the end of child support upon the state finding of
malfeasance.140
In a similar case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed
that "automatically cutting off financial support to a child at the
time parental rights to the child are terminated ignores the
plain language and intent of our statutes."' Other courts have
held that financial payments do not equal a continued relationship with the parent. 142
Several states have embraced this modern approach, expressly detaching parental obligations and rights. State statutes
note that rights can be curtailed while obligations continue. In
contrast to the traditional approach that rights and obligations
are reciprocal, now "[n]early every jurisdiction provides that the
best interests of the child are the number one priority in parental termination proceedings."143 Jason M. Merrill argues that
discharging a child support obligation will often do exactly the
opposite and be unduly harmful to the child144
Many of these arguments also apply to the emancipationchild support context. Parental misconduct, though not typically
rising to the level of neglect that would warrant state intervention, is often at issue in emancipation proceedings. Emancipation courts could thus turn to the logic of the Michigan and
Rhode Island courts. Most broadly, the courts' language supports a reading that the rights and obligations of parents need
not be considered entangled in every case.
The strongest counterargument to this reasoning comes in
the "have their cake and eat it" view of post-emancipation child
support. Professor Castle described the argument this way: "The
standard of living of a child without parental support may be
140 See id. See also Merrill, Note, 11 J L & Fam Stud at 211 (cited in note 119) ("The
financial struggle faced by single mothers often places them in the precarious situation
of choosing between protecting their children by filing a petition to terminate the rights
of an abusive or neglectful co-parent, or preserving the child's right to support by foregoing such a petition.").
141 State v Fritz, 801 A2d 679, 688 (RI 2002). The child support statute, RI Gen
Laws § 15-5-16.2, states that "the court may from time to time upon the petition of either
party review and alter its decree relative to the amount of support and the payment of
it," consistent with the best interests of the child. RI Gen Laws § 15-5-16.2(a), (c)(2). The
Fritz court noted that the parental termination statute, RI Gen Laws 1956 § 15-7-7, addresses only the "legal rights of the parent to the child" and not the reverse, indicating
that the child could maintain a right to support from his parent even after parental
rights are terminated. Fritz, 801 A2d at 685.
142 See Merrill, Note, 11 J L & Fam Stud at 208 & n 51 (cited in note 119).
143 Id at 207.
144 See id at 208.
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well below that which was available to him within the family
unit. But, allowing a child to continue to enjoy those comforts
and advantages while defying parental authority permits the
'destruction of all parental authority."'145
Judge Roger Monroe, concurring in Anderson v Loper,146 expressed this fear in support of his conclusion that the child in
that case was not emancipated even though he had moved out
against his parent's wishes.147 The judge commented that "the
law is doing no favors to either the 'child' or the parents by requiring the parents to continue to support that 'child' under the
guise of child support" because continuation of child support
would remove any incentive the child would have had to be obedient.148 He stated: "In essence, we make it possible for her [to]
disobey her parents."49
These concerns about children's behavior in a postemancipation-child support world may very well be outweighed
by concerns about parents' behavior in the alternate status quo
world of no post-emancipation child support. In the neglect and
abuse context, courts have been cautious about creating incentives to "force" a breaking of parental rights if that would relieve
a parent of a child support obligation.6o Mandating termination
of support after emancipation may create perverse incentives in
a similar way: the child should not fail to seek emancipation in
cases in which it is advisable for fear of having child support cut
off, nor should the parent push the child toward emancipation
because the parent wants relief from a support obligation.
Further, it is important to stress that in no situation will
post-emancipation child support be guaranteed. Its availability
in appropriate cases would not bind the hands of judges in the
kinds of cases of concern to Judge Monroe, when awarding support might be counterproductive.
It is unclear whether the concern about adults behaving
strategically should be greater than the concern about children
behaving strategically. But it is clear that both must be fairly
considered as part of the discussion-and it is arguably the case
that the costs and harms of adults behaving strategically are

145
146
147
148
149
150

Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 370 (cited in note 5).
689 S2d 118 (Ala Civ App 1996).
Id at 120-21 (Monroe concurring).
Id (Monroe concurring).
Id at 121 (Monroe concurring).
See Merrill, Note, 11 J L & Fam Stud at 207-08 (cited in note 119).
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more widespread, from a child-welfare perspective and from the
systemic value of parental responsibility.
2. Child support.
In contrast to the child-custody situation, parental rights
are often explicitly tied to their obligations when it comes to an
existing child support order. There are many cases in which a
parent's failure to pay child support resulted in a termination or
limitation of parental rights.161 The state has a strong interest in
enforcing child support obligations through restrictive measures
as a means of deterring parents from shirking their obligations.
This may seem like a counterexample, in that parental obligations and rights are linked. Post-emancipation child support
demands the opposite: a conceptual separation of parental rights
and obligations, such that obligations might continue even after
rights are terminated. However, the broader goals of both policies would be similar, using child support as a stick. Parents
who fail to provide a stable home for children such that children
seek emancipation arguably should not be relieved of support
obligations, much as courts have found that parents who fail to
pay their child support orders should not be immediately entitled to such rights as visitation.
C. The Line Is Already Blurred
If emancipation were in practice a complete change in a
child's legal status, one would expect the following: Parents
would have no obligations or liabilities to their emancipated
children. Unemancipated children would have no rights of
adulthood before reaching the age of majority. And finally, one
would predict that emancipation would be as the law intends for
it to be, a severance that is both total and permanent.
In reality, none of these propositions is true. This lends support to the idea that the emancipation line is already blurred.
Indeed, there is significant evidence that emancipation was never a bright line at all; partial emancipation as a concept has existed for decades. Prior to the enactment of emancipation
151 See, for example, In re KD., 647 SE2d 360, 369 (Ga App 2007) (holding that the
father being behind on child support was enough to support termination of parental
rights). But see In re B.W.Z.-S., 222 P3d 613, 617 (Mont 2009) (holding that the fact that
a father was behind on child support payments did not warrant an order terminating his
parental rights to child).
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statutes, common law cases discussed partial emancipation.152
Traditionally, these partial emancipations were very specific: a
child could be emancipated, for example, for the limited purpose
of being able to retain his own wages. Some of these cases have
even gone so far as to hold that parental support should, in some
circumstances, continue beyond emancipation.5a
It would be a surprising outcome if legislatures intended
emancipation statutes-at least those that do not explicitly bar
post-emancipation child support-to foreclose an option of partial emancipation that would have been available at common
law.154 Post-emancipation child support is merely a point further
along the common law spectrum; instead of the child being
emancipated for limited purposes, he may be emancipated for all
purposes of majority save one: the right to collect support from
his parents.
Courts are increasingly recognizing that flexibility and discretion are often key to serving the best interests of the child.
Various cases demonstrate this trend.
1. Post-emancipation parental liability.
In several contexts, emancipation does not grant parents a
total reprieve from their obligations. One academic notes that
"[p]itfalls [a]wait [e]mancipated [p]arents" who end up with unexpected expenses and liability following the emancipation of
their children.166 She gives the example of parental liability for
auto accidents caused by emancipated minors.156 In California,
the California Vehicle Code trumps any emancipation order,
meaning that a parent who signed a child's application for a
152 See, for example, In re Sonnenberg, 99 NW2d 444, 447-48 (Minn 1959) ("With
the passage of time a number of courts, including this court, have come to recognize (although loath in many instances to recognize what they were doing by name) that emancipation be complete, partial, conditional, absolute, or limited as to time or purpose.") (citation omitted); In re Marriageof Robinson, 629 P2d 1069, 1072 (Colo 1981) (noting that
"[a] minor may be emancipated for some purposes but not for others").
153 See In re Sonnenberg, 99 NW2d at 448 (noting that courts have held that emancipation may be limited to termination of parental rights and control without relieving
the parent of his obligations of support); Fevig v Fevig, 559 P2d 839, 841 (NM 1977)
(finding that support could continue because emancipation was "partial" but noting explicitly that "there is no express emancipation in this case').
154 For a use of the traditional rule that a statute should be read as not to override
long-standing common law, see United States v Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993).
155 See generally Christina Baine DeJardin, PitfallsAwait EmancipatedParents, 16
J Contemp Legal Issues 311 (2007).
156 Id at 312-13.
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driver's license is still financially responsible for the child's torts
even after the child is emancipated..5
Similarly, even beyond the statutory age of majority that
triggers automatic emancipation, several state courts have ordered divorced parents to continue supporting their children's
educational expenses. 58 This has been a contentious issue for
courts. Some states have held that they are without jurisdiction
to order child support payments beyond the age of majority.169
There is variety in state positions today,160 but several states do

disregard the supposed "automatic emancipation" age of majority in ordering that a support order continue while the child pursues his college education.11 This suggests that the law already
recognizes support for children beyond the age of majority,
where a strict interpretation of the emancipation-child support
line would not.
2. Pre-emancipation medical decisions.
Conversely, several areas of law already grant minors authority over decisions or roles that typically fall to parents. The
most striking example of this is in the medical context. While
traditionally parents have full authority to provide or withhold
consent for minors to receive medical treatment,162 courts and
legislatures have carved out notable exceptions.

157 Cal Fam Code §7050(d). See also Cal Vehicle Code § 17707; DeJardin, 16 Contemp Legal Issues at 312 (cited in note 155).
158 See, for example, Baldino v Baldino, 575 A2d 66, 69 (NJ Super Ct 1990) (stating
that a child above the age of majority would continue to be unemancipated for the purposes of support while he sought further education).
159 See, for example, Curtis v Kline, 666 A2d 265, 270 (Pa Super Ct 1995) (holding
that a Pennsylvania statute requiring parents subject to a support obligation to pay for
college expenses was unconstitutional).
160 See Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich and Scott Adam Laterra, Child Support and
College: What Is the Correct Result?, 22 J Am Acad Matrim Law 335, 341-72 (2009) (surveying the states' rules on college child support).
161 See Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument against
Including Post-majority EducationalExpenses in Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 Ind L
Rev 343, 347 n 23 (2001) (citing that college expenses may be imposed on divorced parents in eighteen states).
162 See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J Crim L & Criminol 15, 47 (1994) (finding that, at common law, minors lacked the legal authority to consent to health treatment and that any treatment
required parental consent).
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Many states allow minors to obtain treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases and substance abuse.163 Similarly, several
states recognize the "Mature Minor Doctrine" by which minors
have the right to consent to medical treatment without parental
approval.164 The doctrine authorizes the minor to consent "if that
minor is of sufficient maturity and intelligence to understand
and appreciate the benefits and risks of the proposed treatment."165 This right has been recognized in Arkansas, Georgia,

Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
York, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia.166
3. Post-emancipation revocation.
Emancipation orders are not, in reality, permanent. For example, the Family Code in California authorizes the court to rescind an emancipation order if the minor has no means of support.167 This revocation can be initiated by the child or an agent
of the state, such as the District Attorney.16 As such, Christina
B. DeJardin argues that "[t]he true rule seems more like that a
parent doesn't have to support the emancipated minor so long as
the minor doesn't need to be supported."169 Similar abilities to

163 See Christine M. Hanisco, Note, Acknowledging the Hypocrisy: Granting Minors
the Right to Choose Their Medical Treatment, 16 NY L Sch J Hum Rts 899, 899-900
(2000).
164 Id at 912. See also Lawrence Schlam and Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to
the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 Health Matrix 141, 151 (2000)
(stating that "[t]he doctrine permits minor children to seek required medical treatment
with confidentiality, and ensures that they receive treatment in situations in which requiring parental consent would prevent them from doing so").
165 Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to Health Care, 10
Touro L Rev 637, 641 (1994).
166 See Alicia Ouellette, Body Modification andAdolescent Decision Making: Proceed
with Caution, 15 J Health Care L & Pol 129, 133 & n 32 (2012) (discussing the complexity of the law surrounding health decisions by minors and listing states that recognize the
mature minor doctrine); Hanisco, Note, 16 NY L Sch J Hum Rts at 913 n 108 (cited in
note 163).
167 Cal Fam Code § 7130(b). See also DeJardin, 16 J Contemp Legal Issues at 313
(cited in note 155).
16a See Cal Fain Code § 7132(a). See also DeJardin, 16 J Contemp Legal Issues at
313 (cited in note 155); Shireen Boulos and Jessica Goldberg, Emancipated Minors, in
Jacqueline V. Lerner, Richard M. Lerner, and Jordan Finkelstein, eds, 1 Adolescence in
America: An Encyclopedia 251, 252-53 (ABC-CLIO 2001) ("[A] few states allow emancipation to be revoked if a minor later becomes dependent on public benefits.").
169 DeJardin, 16 J Contemp Legal Issues at 313 (cited in note 155).
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rescind emancipation during the child's minority exist in Wisconsin and lowa.170

Given these "loopholes," one has to ask how much of a departure post-emancipation child support, in certain circumstances, would be from the current state of the law. Parents are
already unable to control unemancipated children's medical decisions; they can, however, be liable for emancipated children's
torts and educational expenses; and an emancipation order can
be terminated if a child is unable to support himself. These represent examples of how far bright-line emancipation has been
faded into a gray zone, mostly by judicial interpretations of
statutes.
D.

Changed Circumstances in Parent-Child Dynamics and
Family Law

There are two categories of changed circumstances that are
important considerations for emancipation law. First, children
are growing up faster than they did a generation ago, and, second, family instability has increased. These help explain why
emancipation has become more of a relevant issue and why
courts should perhaps evaluate emancipation statutes more critically than when they were first passed. Partly in response to
these changed family dynamics, several other areas of family
law have liberalized in both statutory and nonstatutory ways,
suggesting that emancipation law is on a similar trajectory away
from rigid categories. Where the reexamination of emancipation
statutes is necessary, the patterns that have emerged in like areas of family law can provide critical guidance.
1. Children's maturity and family stability.
Children are becoming adultlike at an earlier age as a result
of social and technological changes in the post-World War II era.
Professor Castle wrote that minors are "growing up faster today,
maturing at an earlier age, and more capable of handling their
own affairs."17n
170 See Chadwick N. Gardner, Note, Don't Come Cryin' to Daddy! Emancipation of
Minors: When Is a Parent "Free at Last" from the Obligation of Child Support?, 33 U
Louisville J Fam Law 927, 936 (1995).
171 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 360 (cited in note 5).
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At the same time, society has moved far from the stereotypical nuclear, two-parent family unit of the 1950s.172 Family com-

position has rapidly changed, through greater divorce, singleparent families, and remarriages.173 A recent article noted, "Single-parent households make up about thirty percent of all families."174 Census data indicate that fewer people marry today and
divorce rates are higher. The percentage of births to unmarried
women increased dramatically, from 5 percent of all births in
1958175 to 40 percent of births in 2011.176 By some accounts,
"[o]ver the second half of the twentieth century ... [flamily in-

stability [ I increased sharply."7n It is notable that most of these
changes occurred after the wave of emancipation statutes in the
1960s and 1970s.
What do the faster onset of adulthood and the decline in
traditional families mean for emancipation? There are two expected outcomes. First, one would expect that emancipations
have become more common, suggesting that greater attention
should be paid to the laws surrounding them. It is no longer the
case, as it may have been in 1968, that emancipation was described as a "peculiar and, fortunately, unimportant corner of
the law."178
Second, it is likely that the emancipation statutes-written
and enacted a generation ago-might not adequately capture the
needs of today's families.179 Consider the increasingly common
172 See Morgan, 42 Fam L Q at 365 (cited in note 40) (arguing that the 1950s' model
of the nuclear family has been rendered obsolete).
173 See Ann Laquer Estin, Golden Anniversary Reflections: Changes in Marriageafter Fifty Years, 42 Fam L Q 333, 334 (2008) (noting that changes in the family and in
family law have "come fast and furious" since 1958).
174 Samin Valimohammadi, Are Two ParentsReally Better than One?, 16 J Contemp
Legal Issues 9, 9 (2007).
175 Estin, 42 Fam L Q at 335-36 (cited in note 173).
176 Suzanne M. Bianchi, Changing Families, Changing Workplaces, 21 Future of
Children 15, 18 (Fall 2011).
177 Id at 16.
178 Castle, 20 Fam L Q at 359 (cited in note 5), quoting Homer H. Clark, The Law of

Domestic Relations in the United States § 8.3 at 240 (West 1968).
179 Not every emancipation statute is a relic of a different generation; Arizona's
statute, for example, was passed in 2005. Arizona explicitly authorized that "[an emancipation order issued pursuant to this article terminates a parent's or legal guardian's
... [fluture child support obligations relating to the emancipated minor." Ariz Rev Stat
Ann § 12-2454.B. It could thus be argued that, if the circumstances were so changed
from the 1970s, a legislature in 2005 would have recognized the need for greater flexibility in enacting a modern statute.
However, the bill summary from the House in Arizona suggests that the legislature
was influenced by the language in existing statutes in passing its own. The emancipation
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situation of siblings raising younger siblings because their parents are unfit.180 Under the current emancipation-child support

dichotomy, if these children sought emancipation from their
parents, they might lose the right to needed financial support. If
child support were to be granted in select post-emancipation situations, these children would not lose an entitlement to support
based on factors outside their control.
2. Family-law liberalization.
In other areas of family law, laws have better evolved to
protect the rights of family members in tense family situations.
A parallel exists between liberalizing the rights of children in
broken families and liberalizing divorce laws for parties in
dissolving marriages.181

Professors Sanger and Willemsen

drew this connection, noting that "[i]ncompatibility and irretrievable breakdown are not concepts limited only to the marital relationship."182
Until the mid-twentieth century, fault-based divorce was
the norm in American jurisdictions; "divorce was seen as a remedy for those spouses who had been wronged by their partner."183

But as values changed, the concern of "the strong public interest
in preserving marriage" became less salient.184 By 1985, nearly

and child support question was not directly discussed in the passage of the bill. See HB
2428 Bill Summary, 47th Ariz Legis, 1st Reg Sess, 2005, online at
2 2
http://www.azleg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/47leg/1r/summary/h.hb 4 8
02-16-05_hs.doc.htm&Session_ID=82 (visited Nov 24, 2013). That one state chose to use
more restrictive language in the passage of its statute should not weigh heavily against
the argument that circumstances have dramatically changed in families.
180 See Heather Won Tesoriero, Siblings Raising Siblings, Time *1 (May 6, 2001),
online at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,108827-1,00.html (visited
Nov 24, 2013) (noting that two million children grow up in kinship care away from their
parents).
181 Following the 1960s, it became significantly easier for women to collect monetary
compensation from ex-spouses even in no-fault divorces. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California'sNo-Fault Divorce Law, 75 Cal L Rev 291, 306-07 (1987) (noting
that "[e]vidence of fault is no longer admissible to determine the existence of irreconcilable differences, nor can it be used to modify or revoke spousal support where the supported spouse is living in nonmarital cohabitation with another person . . .") (citation
omitted). Diamond drew this as a relevant comparison in discussing that another kind of
support, spousal support, does not depend on any discussion of whether the recipient is
capable of managing his or her own financial affairs. See Diamond, 283 P3d at 267-68.
162 Sanger and Willemsen, 25 U Mich J L Ref at 348 (cited in note 18).

183 Lauren Guidice, New York and Divorce: FindingFault in a No Fault System, 19
J L & Pol 787, 793 (2011).
184 Id at 794 (quotation marks omitted).
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every jurisdiction had abandoned fault-based divorce.185 It became significantly easier for spouses to obtain divorces in nofault regimes.
In addition to lessening the requirements for divorce, "[t]he
law [ ] largely abandoned the moral discourse that once surrounded marriage and divorce, and the status norms that once
defined the rights and obligations of husbands and wives."186
Laws became increasingly neutral on the norms of marriage and
family law.187 This focus on neutrality as to how families are
structured-and what options are available in the case of the
breakdown of the family unit-has modern implications for
emancipation. Some pro-minor results that would have been
viewed with skepticism in a fault-based-divorce world are now
accepted as supporting the best interests of the child. For example, consider the minor's increased ability to make his own medical decisions even absent any signs of parental abuse.188

The fact that an increasing number of states are enacting
emancipation statutes means that emancipation procedures are,
in many jurisdictions, becoming clearer, and that the option of
emancipation is more available. However, the circumstances
under which emancipations occur are broader than was initially
anticipated. It is likely true, for example, that in enacting its
emancipation act, the California legislature thought emancipation would terminate a child support obligation. But it is also
true that the legislature understood emancipation primarily as a
tool for granting official recognition to the children who had voluntarily left their homes, such that they would not be picked up
as runaways.189 According to one of the California emancipation
statute's principal authors, the drafters "never imagined" parental manipulation would play a role in emancipation proceedings.o90 The fact that emancipations are occurring in a wider variety of circumstances than was initially contemplated by the

185 See id at 793. New York was a notable exception, retaining fault-based divorce
until 2010. See Domestic Relations Law, in Relation to No Fault Divorce, 2010 NY Sess
Laws ch 384, codified at NY Dom Rel Law § 170(7).
186 Estin, 42 Fain L Q at 335 (cited in note 173).
187 See id.
188 See Part III.C.2.
189 Sanger and Willemsen, 25 U Mich J L Ref at 246 (cited in note 18).

190 Id at 331 n 375.
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legislature suggests that a reevaluation of the emancipationchild support dichotomy may be in order.191
Many states do not require parental "consent" to emancipation if the court finds it in the minor's best interest. And yet, the
termination of child support upon emancipation serves as a major impediment. It is akin to requiring a finding of fault prior to
divorce: adding a barrier to what may be a desirable, even inevitable, outcome.
In the divorce case, the modernization took place through
the liberalization of statutes. But this Comment does not argue
that a legislative shift and rewriting of statutes would be necessary to accomplish what may, in fact, be in the best interest of
the child in the emancipation context. There is ample precedent
suggesting that courts may reinterpret family-law doctrine
based on changed circumstances. For example, presumptions of
paternity have evolved. It was a strong common law presumption that a child of a married woman is a product of the marriage.192 A mother or other party seeking to establish paternity

by a man who was not her husband had to overcome this "marital presumption" by clear and convincing evidence.19 But courts
have recognized that this presumption is not always useful in
modern family situations and may serve the counterproductive
function of estopping mothers or putative fathers from establishing paternity.
In Brinkley v King,194 the court questioned the presumption
"because the nature of male-female relationships appears to
have changed dramatically since the presumption was created."196 The court noted that "separation, divorce, and children
born during marriage to third party fathers" have become relatively common. 96 Thus, applying the principle of cessante ratione
legis cessat et ipsa lex,197 the court announced'a rule of declining

to apply the marital presumption in cases in which it did not

191 See note 80 and accompanying text. See also Redd v Redd, 901 NE2d 545, 54849 (Ind App 2009) (stating that both the mother and the father of a minor sought to modify their child support obligations after the mother sought a petition for emancipation).
192 See Brinkley v King, 701 A2d 176, 179 (Pa 1997).
193 Id.
194 701 A2d 176 (Pa 1997).
195 Id at 180-81.
196 Id at 181. See also Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 113-15 (1989) (Scalia)
(plurality).
197 Translated as "[w]hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself also ceases."
Black's Law Dictionary at 1821 (cited in note 12).
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make sense. 198 This holding did not merely change common law
presumptions; it explicitly modified the application of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,199 which courts
had previously applied only after the initial paternity presumption was overcome. 200
Similarly, other areas of family law have liberalized in response to the changing structures of families. For most of the
latter part of the twentieth century, court decisions evinced an
"attitude that the mother had a prima facie right to custody" of
children.201 But "the maternal preference rule seems to have
eroded somewhat in recent years," in favor of a "best interests of
the child" approach.202 This trend has held both in common law
jurisdictions and in jurisdictions in which child custody statutes
have expressed a view as to whether the mother or father should
be preferred.203
These examples of changed circumstances demonstrate why
emancipation doctrine may be liberalizing at the same pace as
analogous areas of family law. The practice of banning child
support post-emancipation is a prime candidate for cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex, given that modern children's best

interests would sometimes be served by living independently
while still receiving support. A neutral, non-fault-based option
may be the most respectful way a court can stay out of family
dynamics. The next Section takes these lessons from the purposes behind emancipation statutes, similar statutes, and the evolution of other areas of family law to propose an approach for
judges to use in determining how to evaluate emancipation and

child support in an individual case.

Brinkley, 701 A2d at 181.
199 23 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5104(c).
200 See Brinkley, 701 A2d at 186-87 (Newman concurring and dissenting). In changing the use of the presumption, Justice Newman noted that Pennsylvania was one of only a few states that refused to allow a rebuttal of the presumption. See id at 188. See also
198

David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-custodial Parents, 34 Hofstra L Rev
1461, 1464 (2006) ("Increasingly, however, noncustodial parents are turning their attention to the courts as well, demanding better or equal treatment as a matter of constitutional right."); Melanie B. Jacobs, Overcoming the Marital Presumption, 50 Fam Ct Rev
289, 293-94 (2012).
201

Thomas R. Trenkner, Modern Status of Maternal PreferenceRule or Presumption

in Child Custody Cases, 70 ALR3d 267 (1976).
202 Id at 268.
203 See id at 270.
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Proposal: Totality of Circumstances

Based on an analogy to other areas of family law, this
Comment argues for a totality-of-circumstances approach to the
emancipation-child support question. It is certainly not the case
that a court should award continued child support to every child
seeking emancipation. But, as Diamond demonstrates, it is also
not the case that no child seeking emancipation deserves continued child support. This Comment takes the position that the
intent of both emancipation and child support statutes, a comparison to other statutes, and a study of changed circumstances
all counsel in favor of a flexible approach to the relationship between emancipation and child support.
The following proposal addresses two critical questions: how
a totality-of-circumstances approach would be effectuated and in
which states this approach is more or less likely to succeed.
First, instead of viewing emancipation as a black-and-white
line, the court should view the emancipation package as something that can be unbundled to the extent a state's statute allows. The primary question is for what purpose(s) the minor
should be considered emancipated. As part of this inquiry, the
court should consider whether the emancipated minor should
continue to receive support from his parents. Based on language
of emancipation statutes and of similar statutes, as well as an
evaluation of the differing purposes in drafting these statutes,
the following questions are of highest importance.
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TABLE 2. QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION IN GRANTING POSTEMANCIPATION SUPPORT OR OTHER BENEFITS

Purpose of the

Question

Question
Legislatures did

1. Who initiated the
emancipation?

not intend for
emancipation to
be a coercive tool
for parents to
relieve their

Implications
If parent 4 evidence
for continued
support.

If child 4 look to
other factors.

obligations.___________

2. To what extent is
e
2.Toawhat
the parent
responsible for the
child's decision to
seek emancipation?

Legislatures did
not intend for
emancipation to
be a coercive tool
for parents to

Greater evidence for
continued support
the more that a
parent exhibited
behavior that caused

relieve their
obligations,
Legislatures
intended for the
"best interests of
the child" to be a
primary

the child to
emancipate.

consideration.

3.nor's
Wh a

ia

mbitos ania
oblgatisonsan
support?

4. What are the
child's educational
goals and expenses?

Courts and
statutes have
begun to employ
the more
expansive read of
'' managing one's
financial affairs."
Legislatures
intended for the
"best interests of
the child" to be a
primary

Greater evidence for
continued support if
child is ineligible for
other sources of state
support, if financially
responsible.
Greater evidence for
continued support if
child is in school.

consideration.

In an area of law as complex and personal as family dynamics, one-size-fits-all statutes may, in practice, fail to achieve the
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legislature's goal of advancing the best interests of the child.
These statutes may have secondary goals, such as procedural efficiency and clarity, but ultimately each comes down to child
well-being. Courts can help make these statutes more effective
by focusing their inquiry on the best interests of the child.
Second, this proposal addresses the question of where a totality-of-circumstances approach is most likely to be implemented. A Diamond-inspired solution to post-emancipation child
support is not limited to New Mexico. The evidence for such
comes broadly from similar legislative goals across the states in
emancipation and child support statutes, comparison to other
statutes, evidence of the lines being blurred, and changed
circumstances.
New Mexico's statute, listing that a minor shall be emancipated for "one or more of the [enumerated] purposes,"204 is especially flexible. Other states are vague on the explicit effects of
emancipation. By contrast, a number of states expressly ban
post-emancipation child support.
The likelihood of implementation of a Diamond-like scheme
thus varies across the states. In some states, this Comment's
proposed approach would fit neatly with existing state law
(these states designated "high"). These "high" states have an
emancipation statute with language that leaves room for a Diamond view of unbundling the consequences of emancipation as
laid out in the statute.
In states that lack emancipation statutes altogether, a Diamond solution still holds promise. In granting judicial emancipations, judges in these states can still embrace the spirit of Diamond by setting a judicial order defining the consequences of
emancipation. This is more likely to succeed in states that have
child support statutes that do not mention emancipation (designated "medium"). In these "medium" states, a judge would have
discretion to determine whether continued child support should
exist as part of an emancipation order, because no child support
statute would expressly forbid this.
It is a different story for states without emancipation statutes, but whose child support statutes list "emancipation" as a
terminating event (designated "low"). Even in these states, however, judges may be able to grant post-emancipation child support. If a statute does not define what emancipation is, the judge
204

NM Stat Ann

§

32A-21-4.
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has more discretion in determining whether the child is "emancipated" for the purpose of the child support statutory termination. The judge should look to the common law understanding of
emancipation, which (as discussed in Part III.C) often distinguished total from partial emancipation.205
Partial emancipation was considered, at common law, to
have different legal effects than total emancipation. Citing the
1969 case of Turner v Turner,206 Professor Katz, Professor
Schroeder, and Sidman stated that:
[A] partially emancipated child is occasionally able to assert
rights normally incident to complete emancipation while
still able to enforce parental obligations. Thus, for example,
a minor child ... may still be eligible to receive child sup-

port on the theory that, since only a partial emancipation
took place, the child could revert to an unemancipated status at any time prior to attaining the age of majority.207
By the same logic, a judge may determine that a child seeking
continued child support is only partially emancipated, such that
the child's status would not bar him from continued support under the child support statute.
Alternatively, in states that do not define emancipation in a
statute, there is reason to believe that not all kinds of emancipation would have been contemplated by the legislature as terminating events. Consider, for example, Kentucky's child support
statute, Ky Rev Ann Stat §403.213. It states: "Unless otherwise
agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions
for the support of a child shall be terminated by emancipation of
the child." Kentucky does not have an emancipation statute that
defines emancipation. The child support statute, however, explains the different specifications for support if the emancipation is triggered by marriage or age. If by stating that child support terminates at emancipation, the legislature really meant
"upon the age of majority or marriage," then the child support
mandate may be less applicable to voluntary emancipations.
Though the case for implementation of a Diamond approach is
not as strong as in other states, judges in these "low" states
could consider whether granting post-emancipation child
205 See Robinson, 629 P2d at 1072 (noting that "[a] minor may be emancipated for
some purposes but not for others").
206 441 SW2d 105 (Ky App 1969).
207 Katz, Schroeder, and Sidman, 7 Fam L Q at 215 (cited in note 11).
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support would be consistent with their states' common law definitions of emancipation.
Finally, states with a statute that explicitly bars postemancipation child support represent a fourth category of states.
These cannot adopt a Diamond framework without a legislative
change (designated "no").
Informed by a study of state statutes, the following table
lays out the four categories of the likelihood of judges implementing the Diamond approach-by which a child may be
deemed emancipated and still able to collect child support-in
different states.
TABLE 3. LIKELIHOOD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A DIAMOND
APPROACH

High

Medium

Low

No

State has an emancipation statute that does not
have "all-or-nothing" language: for example,
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont.
State has no emancipation statute: for example,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Wisconsin.
State has no emancipation statute, but the child
support statute lists emancipation as a
terminating event for child support: for example,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York.
State has emancipation statute that explicitly bars
post-emancipation child support: for example,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Mississippi, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.

CONCLUSION

Emancipation has become a popular statutory tool in the
past forty years. Unfortunately, statutes and case law have
failed to keep up with the complex and intricate situations that
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surround emancipation. The Diamond court carefully analyzed
this problem in one such confused context: the relationship between emancipation and child support. The court ultimately determined that the best interests of the child would be met-and
the emancipation statute would not be violated-if the court
awarded post-emancipation child support.
Diamond was the first time a court specifically made this
pronouncement in the context of statutory partial emancipation.
This Comment argues that the logic is eminently sensible. Indeed, there is evidence that post-emancipation child support
may have been a concept that drafters of the relevant statutes
would have cited with approval. An analysis of the goals of the
emancipation and child support statutes supports this solution,
as it aligns with both the best interests of the child and financial
soundness for the state.
Similarly, the Diamond solution gains support from the fact
that the emancipation line is already blurred. Unemancipated
children are now able to make their own medical decisions in
many states; by contrast, emancipated children can still force
their parents to pay for their car accidents and college expenses.
Finally, other areas of family law are moving in the same direction: liberalization away from rigid categories.
The solution could be introduced to varying degrees in the
fifty states. In some states that have flexible partial emancipation language, judges could implement a Diamond approach today. In others, such a system may still be possible, either under
the terms of existing statutes or through legislative reform.
For both parents and children, the notion of postemancipation child support may create the proper incentives to
achieve the best outcome for the family. Rather than "having
their cake and eating it too," the better framing of postemancipation child support may be-in some cases-"the best of
both worlds."

